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The advent of transition in the former communist countries set in 
motion significant changes not only in the countries concerned but 
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also emerged, as the country was suddenly presented with a new set 
of political problems and economic threats and opportunities that 
were urgently calling for a new approach to managing its economic 
and international relations. This paper examines exactly these 
developments in the Greek foreign economic policy in the Balkans 
and argues that, despite some significant innovations and policy 
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Greece’s new Balkan Economic Relations:  
policy shifts but no structural change 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The advent of transition in the former communist countries set in motion 
significant changes not only in the countries concerned but also in the 
economic and geo-political environment of Greece. The process of political and 
economic transition in the former communist countries altered dramatically the 
political economy and international relations of Europe in general and between 
the European Union and the countries of the former Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance (CMEA) in particular. The opening-up of the economies 
of these countries shifted the centre of gravity of the European economy to the 
east and altered noticeably the economic geography of the continent. For 
Greece, in particular, these changes signalled also an end to the physical-
geographic and, subsequently, economic isolation of the country, a factor that 
had been constraining its economic development and its firmer integration 
(economic as well as political) to the EU (Christodoulakis and Petrakos, 1997).  
Despite these largely positive developments, such changes also brought about 
some new challenges for Greece. The country was suddenly presented with a 
new set of political problems and economic threats and opportunities that were 
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urgently calling for a new approach to managing its economic and international 
relations – a challenge on which Greece had limited experience and for which it 
was all but well prepared (Ioakimidis, 1999a). The social and political 
instability that resulted from the collapse of communism in its immediate 
neighbourhood and, almost immediately, from the disintegration of Yugoslavia 
represented a clear threat to Greece’s own political stability but also a novel 
challenge for Greece to abandon its traditional role as a subject of international 
intervention and assume a more active interventionist role in international 
politics. Similarly, the opening up of the Balkan economies presented Greece 
with new challenges with regards to managing its European and regional 
economic relations and using its economy to mobilise economic development 
regionally – but also included a threat to its economy through increased 
competition (for European markets, for inward investment, etc) with its new-
found neighbours. Related to these economic and political developments were 
the more acute challenges and pressures to Greece from the wave of new 
migrants that flooded the country and the socio-economic tensions that resulted 
from that (Lianos, 2003).  
Greece’s response to these challenges, threats and opportunities has been the 
subject of extensive research in the literature (Couloumbis and Yannas, 1996; 
Coufoudakis et al, 1999; Tsardanidis and Stavridis, 2005; Economides, 2005) 
and some heated debates in policy circles and the public domain. As is 
commonly accepted, as its status of an isolated European laggard situated in the 
Balkan Peninsula withered, Greece first emerged as ‘a Balkan state in the EU’ 
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– to become only noticeably later a source of stability and development in the 
region, consistent with a function as a ‘European state in the Balkans’ (Kazakos 
and Ioakimidis, 1994; Veremis, 1995; Triantafyllou, 1998; Ioakimidis, 1999a; 
Houliaras and Tsardanidis, 2006). The reasons for this policy hysteresis, 
especially in the realm of politics, have been extensively studied and include 
the historical-psychological attachment of Greece to an ill-perceived notion of 
fairness and justice in international affairs (Pettifer, 1996; Close, 2002; 
Koliopoulos and Veremis, 2003), its equally ill-perceived self-image regarding 
its cultural and historical uniqueness (Diamantouros, 1993), and, most 
importantly, the lack of sufficiently developed institutional structures for the 
design and conduct of its external relations (Ioakimidis, 1999a and 1999b) . It 
is the combination of these three factors that most emphatically explains the 
subordination of Greece’s foreign affairs policies to individuals’ preferences 
and the influence of populist rhetoric, the media and a largely manipulated 
public opinion (Theodoropoulos, 2005).  
Although through the passage of time and under the pressures and influence of 
a number of external and internal factors (including the political isolation of 
Greece following its approach to the FYROM issue and the Yugoslav wars but 
also the rationalisation and Europeanisation of its foreign policy following the 
elevation into power of modernising forces within the ruling party of PASOK1) 
Greece managed to radically alter its political role in the Balkans, its approach 
to economic diplomacy in the region has exhibited a somewhat more limited 
                                                 
1
 See on this Wallden (1999) and especially Ioakimidis (1999a).  
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radicalisation. This chapter examines exactly these developments in the Greek 
foreign economic policy in the Balkans and argues that, despite some 
significant innovations and policy shifts, a paradigmatic structural change in 
Greece’s economic approach to the region is still lacking. Naturally the main 
focus is on state-level economic relations rather than those of the private sector. 
The next section reviews the history of Greece’s Balkan economic relations 
since the late 19th century and until the collapse of the communist regimes in 
the Balkans. Section 3 focuses on the policy approach during the early, mature 
and post-transition periods (roughly, early 1990s; late 1990s; and the 2000s) 
and discusses the main policy shifts and their determinants. Section 4 then 
moves on to discuss the merits and weaknesses of Greece’s policy approach, 
seeking to identify the limitations of the current paradigm of its Balkan 
economic relations. The final section concludes with some recommendations 
for policy.  
 
2. Greece’s Balkan economic relations prior to transition 
During the Ottoman Empire the links of the ‘old’ Greece with the Balkan 
economic space were rather weak and fragmented. The newly formed state was 
rather inward looking and relations with today’s northern Greece and the 
Balkans were constrained through a number of political and security factors. 
On the other hand, the local economies of today’s northern Greece were almost 
fully integrated into the Balkan economic space, with main towns such as 
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Naousa, Siatista and the port of Thessaloniki acting as important hubs for 
economic activity in the region (Stojanovich, 1960; Oikonomou, 1999). The 
Greek state at the time had a limited interaction with such centres, although the 
involvement of the private sector was notably more active (Agriantoni, 1986; 
Anastasopoulos, 1947). With the annexation of today’s northern Greece to the 
Greek state and following the turbulence and ethnic restructuring that 
accompanied the Balkan wars, the economic ties of the region were 
significantly hampered as the centre of gravity shifted southwards. Although 
population flows and exchanges remained significant until the Second World 
War, gradually the northern Greek territories became increasingly disconnected 
from their former Balkan hinterlands (Lampe and Jackson, 1982; Palairet, 
1997). 
The dramatic changes in the region after the Second World War effectively 
made this separation permanent and further intensified the internal economic 
fragmentation of the whole of the peninsula, especially after the early 1950s, 
when the new communist states started embarking in diverging paths in their 
road to socialism. With its northern boarders all but sealed and its economic 
and political centre of gravity moving swiftly towards Athens, Greece went 
through a period of discontinued diplomatic relations with its northern 
neighbours and, naturally, maintained very limited economic relations.  
Trade relations resumed in the mid-1950s, at times helped by a curious 
interaction between global politics and regional economics (i.e., the need for 
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‘bridge-building’ with communist states outside the Warsaw Pact and the 
pressure from the private sector, especially in Northern Greece, for access to 
the Balkan market), although in most cases official trade relations governed by 
bilateral economic agreements were not fully normalised until the mid- to late-
1960s (Wallden, 1999). In the case of Albania, economic relations were 
restored somewhat later (in 1970) and full political relations were only 
normalised in 1987, when Greece abandoned its unilateral state of war against 
the country. Although trade between Greece and its northern neighbours, 
especially Yugoslavia and Romania, increased substantially over the period, in 
absolute terms it remained characteristically limited, especially given the 
geographical proximity, historical ties and economic complementarities (in 
terms of sectoral specialisations) of the countries concerned (Botsas, 1975; 
Giannaris, 1982; Wallden, 1999). Bilateral agreements for the facilitation of 
trade were further developed through the 1980s, but the approach that was 
reflected in these agreements was predominantly one of managing existing 
flows rather than fostering their further development, let alone aiming at 
directing such links towards sectors and products that – at least from a 
theoretical point of view – would be perceived to relate to any strategic 
considerations regarding the development of a regional market and a regional 
production system (e.g., intra-industry trade, development of common revealed 
comparative advantages, trade in sectors and products that would allow 
knowledge diffusion or sharing of supply chains and existing markets, etc – see 
on this Christodoulakis and Petrakos, 1997, or Petrakos, 2003).  
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The extent of trade activity between Greece and its Balkan neighbours was also 
influenced by exogenous factors. Greece’s association and eventual accession 
to the EU led naturally to some trade diversion, especially in agricultural 
products (Tsounis, 2002), while the economic difficulties experienced in the 
Balkan communist countries during the late-1970s and the 1980s – and the 
isolationist policies that were subsequently followed there – naturally 
diminished the demand for Greek exports (Christodoulakis and Petrakos, 
1997). On the other hand, selectively, some sectors managed to increase their 
penetration to the Balkan markets, especially in cases were domestic 
production in Greece was dominated by foreign multinationals. Interestingly, 
over this period, economic relations were predominantly being conducted in a 
non-spatial dimension, between the capitals of the states concerned: cross-
border economic links and links between the traditional regional hubs and their 
hinterlands never recovered to any significant extent (Petrakos and Liargovas, 
2003).  
Besides the limited but notable developments in terms of trade relations, 
economic links and relations in other domains were all but non-existent. Some 
tourist flows (‘exports in services’), especially from Yugoslavia, that provided 
an important boost to economic activity in parts of Central Macedonia were 
perhaps the only significant exception to this (Wallden, 1999). However, factor 
mobility (migration and foreign investments) was totally constrained by the 
region’s political regime. Political cooperation was largely limited to a 
responsive and ad hoc cooperation against Turkey’s perceived expansionism in 
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the region (‘Muslim Arc’ thesis – Houliaras and Tsardanidis, 2006) and 
naturally economic cooperation was lacking a sufficient depth and a wider 
framework or vision. Some attempts for policy cooperation for the management 
of river waters, the development of transport corridors and, partly through the 
influence of the private sector, the creation of energy networks were 
established but they were clearly sporadic, fragmented and ultimately 
unsuccessful (Wallden, 1999). The only robust attempt for an institutional 
development of regional cooperation was the inter-ministerial meetings (at the 
deputy minister and lower levels) initiated by the then Greek Prime Minister, 
C. Karamanlis (the first meeting, of the Ministries of Planning, took place in 
Athens in 1976) and repeated at various levels through to the mid-1980s. These 
meetings largely provided fora for discussion and exchange of ideas but did 
little in the direction of establishing any type of institutionalised regional 
economic cooperation (Ioakimidis, 1999a). The latter only really started taking 
shape in the late 1980s, with the two conferences of the Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs in Belgrade (1988) and Tirana (1990), but was tragically interrupted by 
the developments in former Yugoslavia since the early 1990s. 
Overall, then, throughout this period, Greece’s Balkan economic relations have 
been limited and problematic. Political developments in the 19th and early 20th 
centuries actually acted to disconnect parts of today’s northern Greece from 
their natural Balkan hinterlands, while political developments since the Second 
World War led to the relative isolation of Greece from its northern neighbours 
and, not much later, the further fragmentation of the Balkan economic space. 
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Driven partly by global geo-strategic interests and partly by local business 
needs, economic relations started improving since the late 1960s and steps 
towards bilateral and regional cooperation became firmer closer to the 1980s. 
However, policy responses in this period remained largely reactive (e.g., 
accommodating trade rather than promoting a particular regional 
developmental model) and concentrated in few areas of immediate impact and 
obvious relevance (e.g., trade and water management). The trend of a slow but 
gradual rationalisation of political and economic relations in the Balkans was 
abruptly interrupted in 1990 with a process that altered completely the 
fundamentals of the net of economic and political relations in the region. 
 
3. The transformation of economic relations after the collapse of 
communism 
The sweeping changes that followed the collapse of the communist regimes in 
Central and Eastern Europe had a number of significant implications for 
Greece. From the early phases of transition two major problems emerged. One 
had to do with the socio-economic collapse in Albania and the unprecedented 
immigration waves that this created. The other had to do with the disintegration 
of Yugoslavia and the implications this had for the issue of the constitutional 
name of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Although the economic 
dimension of the first problem was more evident, it was the second issue that 
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actually constrained and determined Greece’s economic policy towards the 
Balkans for much of the 1990s.  
 
3.1. The challenges of the new Balkan space 
Theoretically, the process of economic and political transition of the Balkan 
states towards a system of democratic market economies should open up a 
range of opportunities for Greece. The country could overcome rapidly its 
geographical and economic isolation, not only improving its connection and 
deepening its integration with its EU partners, but importantly also gaining a 
long-missing political and economic neighbourhood (Petrakos, 1996). Its status 
in the region as a developed economy with membership in all key international 
organisations (EU, NATO, OECD, WTO) was offering a great potential for the 
country to assume a leading, if not hegemonic, role in the development of the 
Balkan transition countries and of the Balkan region at large (Petrakos, 1997; 
Wallden, 1999). The opening-up of this new economic space was further 
offering new opportunities regarding resource exploitation (including cheap 
labour costs), new markets and trade partners and, importantly, regarding the 
potential to alter the international competitiveness profile of the country by 
assuming a new role in the international division of labour.2    
                                                 
2
 For example, as was suggested later (Labrianidis, 1996) and realised by the private sector 
much more swiftly, Greece started playing an important intermediary role in the international 
division of labour through the development of triangular manufacturing, where Greek firms 
seized to be the low-cost subcontractor but, rather, became the administrative intermediaries 
between western European importers and low-cost producers in the post-communist Balkans.  
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It is hardly a novelty to say that Greek policy failed to fully appreciate this 
dimension (Huliaras and Tsardanidis, 2006). As was mentioned above – and 
has been analysed extensively elsewhere (Wallden, 1994; Kofos, 1999; 
Couloumbis and Dalis, 1996; Featherstone and Ifantis, 1996; Couloumbis, 
2003; Tsardanidis and Stravridis, 2005) – Greece’s approach to the Balkans in 
the early transition period (1989-1995) was almost totally influenced by ethno-
political and security considerations (regarding real, exaggerated, or simply 
mythical threats) and subsequently economic relations were largely 
subordinated to the foreign policy priorities. As a matter of fact, economic 
relations were almost exclusively used as a means of advancing such objectives 
and priorities (Tsardanidis, 2001), with the ultimate expression of this being the 
unilateral imposition of an embargo to FYROM in February 1994. Similar was 
the approach taken to the issue of Albanian immigration to Greece and of the 
two minorities (again, real or perceived) in the two countries, with Greece even 
blocking some EU aid to Albania - although this contributed much less to the 
political isolation of Greece towards the mid-1990s (Wallden, 1999).  
With this skewed ‘economics for politics’ approach, Greece largely failed to 
grasp in this early transition period the significance of two very important 
developments. Firstly, the need for a holistic regional approach to the Balkans, 
both from Greece and from the EU, that would specifically and explicitly aim 
at designing and implementing a coherent developmental model for the whole 
of the region. At hindsight, had such an approach to foster economic 
development through multilateralism and regional integration been effectively 
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promoted and implemented, it is possible that much of the plight of the Balkans 
during the 1990s (including the size of the transition shocks from which most 
of the countries took over fifteen years to recover, the repeated economic and 
financial crises, and above all the tensions that led to the catastrophic events in 
Bosnia and in Kosovo) could have been avoided. Secondly, the huge 
opportunities offered for regional (sub-national) and national development in 
Greece from the early penetration of Greek businesses in the new markets, 
especially Bulgaria and Albania, but also the need to support and direct this 
penetration in order to manage and mobilise the process of regional economic 
integration and development.  
From the early years after the collapse of communism, Greek businesses were 
presented with a huge comparative advantage, internationally, with regards to 
their access to the new Balkan market (Labrianidis, 1996). ‘Frozen’ historical 
and cultural ties and the informational and transactional advantages of 
proximity, combined with the initial aversion of foreign investors to the 
turbulent Balkans vis-à-vis the much more stable, accessible and developed 
economies of Central and Eastern Europe, meant that Greek businesses were in 
a unique position to develop economic links (through trade, investment, sub-
contracting, relocation and employment of return/repeat migrants) with the 
emerging Balkan economies (Petrakos, 1997). Indeed, as is well documented, 
the penetration of the Greek private sector started as early as 1990: initially 
with very small and largely adventuristic investments just across the borders, 
but growing later to unprecedented dimensions for Greek standards, with a 
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large number of firms (in telecommunications, construction, distribution, 
manufacturing and, above all, the banking sector) obtaining large shares of the 
Balkan market and in some instances also using their Balkan presence as a 
vaulting horse for significant investments further afield (Wallden, 1999; Louri 
et al, 2000; Labrianidis and Kalantaridis, 2004; Bastian, 2004).  
 
3.2. The development of Greek economic relations post-1990 
Greece’s Balkan economic policy in response to these developments and 
challenges was rather simplistic. Consistent with its pre-transition approach, the 
first response was to manage the new and existing economic relations through 
thematic bilateral (and thus fragmented) agreements (Wallden, 1999). Such 
agreements covered a range of economic and other areas, including 
investments, migration, transport and telecommunications, and of course trade, 
but they never intended to do anything more than manage these issues and 
definitely not to integrate the Balkan economic space. In fact, Greece was in 
many respects a follower of EU policy, as is evidenced in the fact that many of 
Greece’s trade agreements with the Balkan countries were covered by the 
various Trade and Cooperation Agreements (or by pre-existing preferential 
agreements) between the latter and the EU. Clearly in an attempt to influence 
the political situation with the Greek minority in Albania, Greece extended its 
Development Acts and Incentives Law to cover parts of this country (since 
1990) and allowed all exports to Albania to be settled in drachmas (in 1993) as 
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a means to boosting investment and trade (and Greek influence) in the region 
(Wallden, 1999; Tsardanidis and Karafotakis, 2000) – and perhaps also 
containing the huge immigration flows. Nevertheless, even this rather 
exceptional move, was never really made part of a wider strategy for economic 
integration, nor was it followed by similar examples elsewhere (e.g., in 
FYROM or Bulgaria), apart from the private sector’s actions within the EU-
inspired and financed INTERREG programmes. In any case, with the perceived 
threats from FYROM (constitutional name issue), Turkey (‘Muslim Arc’ 
thesis) and to a lesser extent Albania and Bulgaria, and subsequently its 
response to adopt a pro-Serbian stance in almost all fronts (Ioakimidis, 1999a; 
Michas, 2002), Greece’s economic relations remained largely subordinate to 
national political considerations and clearly insensitive to the cataclysmic 
developments happening in the private sector of the economy in both sides of 
its borders.3  
With the change in the political situation, both internally in Greece (with the 
gradual strengthening of the modernisers within PASOK) and with regards to 
FYROM (with the signing of the Interim Accord in September 1995), Greece’s 
economic relations in the Balkans started becoming more active and more 
normalised, albeit only very gradually and still with a wider regional vision 
largely missing. The country became increasingly active in promoting regional 
cooperation through various international initiatives and supporting the 
                                                 
3
 Besides the obvious changes in the transition countries, during this period Greece also 
experienced significant transformations, most notably its transformation into a capital-
exporting and labour-importing economy.  
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European perspective of the Balkan transition countries within and outside such 
initiatives (Wallden, 1999). Although its influence in the launch of the EU’s 
Regional Approach in 1996 was limited, Greece played a key role in the 
creation of the SEE Cooperation Process by initiating the Thessaloniki and 
Crete Summits in 1997, which assured the continuation of the first Bulgarian 
initiative of 1996 and achieved some form of institutionalisation (although 
without a permanent secretariat or a budget). Nevertheless, the SEECP was 
characterised by ‘soft cooperation’ and an emphasis on managing existing 
problems (e.g., trafficking) than promoting explicitly regional economic 
integration. A first Action Plan for regional economic cooperation was only 
formulated in 2001 and a formal move towards market integration and further 
institutionalisation did not occur until last year (with the expansion of CEFTA 
to the Western Balkans and the agreement for the establishment of the Regional 
Cooperation Council, in the Bucharest and Thessaloniki Summits, 
respectively). Similarly, after 1996 Greece started providing some formal 
international aid to the Balkans through bilateral agreements and funds 
allocated directly by the Ministry of Finance and Economics, but again its 
approach was fragmented and responsive to specific problems (e.g., the 
pyramid crisis in Albania in 1997 or the Kosovo crisis in 1999 – Tsardanidis 
and Houliaras, 2005), rather than holistic, regionalist and visionary.   
With the normalisation of Greece’s Balkan relations, the launching by the EU 
of the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe, which represented a long-missing 
holistic approach to the region (or, at least, was advertised as such), and the 
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consolidation of the European dimension of the region4, a new period of Greek 
economic relations in the Balkans started. This was characterised by a much 
more integrated and regionalist approach, although problems of efficiency in 
the delivery of policies and of strategy in their design clearly persisted. The 
history of the Hellenic Plan for the Economic Reconstruction of the Balkans – a 
5-year investment support programme initially developed in 1999 – illustrates 
these weaknesses best. It fell victim of various institutional and inter-personal 
policy failures and was thus revised in 2000 and 2002 and took years to 
materialise (Tsardanidis and Houliaras, 2005). 5 Besides the Balkan Plan, 
during this latter period Greece assumed a more active role also within the 
Stability Pact, under the auspices of which a number of multilateral agreements 
were signed, most notably the Memoranda of Understanding for Trade (2001), 
Energy (2002) and Transport (2004). Especially in the areas of Transport 
(through the Trans-European Networks and especially Corridor X that connects 
Thessaloniki with Central Europe and north up to the port of Gdansk in Poland) 
and Energy (with the progress in the Burgas-Alexandroupolis pipeline, and the 
                                                 
4
 With the removal of Milosevic from power in Serbia, the stabilisation of the accession 
trajectory in Bulgaria and Romania, the recovery of foreign investment in the region, and so 
forth.  
5
 The Plan was initiated by the Greek Ministry of Economic and Finance but was eventually 
moved to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, after an open conflict between the relevant 
Ministers. Partly because of this conflict, its objectives were rather mixed, targeting on the 
one hand the provision of financial assistance for large-scale reconstruction and economic 
development projects (79% of budget) and, on the other, the provision of direct subsidies to 
Greek investors in the region (20% of budget). The geographical allocation of the funds was 
also rather problematic, with a clearly uneven distribution favouring Serbia (but much less so 
Kosovo or Montenegro), and the immediate neighbours (emphatically at the expense of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina). The failure of the Plan is evident in the fact that in many cases its 
absorption and completion rates (at least in the part related to the large-scale projects) are 
dismal – leading Greece recently to extend the plan until 2011 but without committing any 
further financial resources. For a concise description of the ‘rise and fall’ of the Hellenic Plan 
for Economic Reconstruction of the Balkans see Miliggos (2001), Tsardanidis  and Houliarias 
(2005) and Harokopos (2006). 
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support for the creation of a Regional Electricity Market, which was eventually 
concluded with the signing of the Energy Community Treaty6), but less so in 
the area of Trade, Greece assumed a leading role in promoting economic 
cooperation while it also thickened its net of bilateral agreements in foreign 
investment, tourism, migration, and so forth. 
Finally, Greece also played a pivotal role in some more recent developments 
within the Southeast Europe Cooperation Process (SEECP). Besides the 2001 
Action Plan for Regional Economic Cooperation mentioned earlier, Greece 
proposed an Action Plan for the Institutional Enhancement of the Cooperation 
Process in 2006. Under its chairmanship-in-office the SEECP produced the 
‘Thessaloniki Declaration’ which re-confirmed the European Perspective of 
SEE and welcomed the establishment of the Regional Cooperation Council 
(RCC) by 2008, which will transform the SEECP into a ‘regionally owned’ 
Stability Pact. With the accession of Bulgaria and Romania into the EU in 
January 2007 and the postponement of any further European enlargements for 
the foreseen future, this thickening and institutionalisation of regional 
cooperation assumes a new and radically different potential. At last, Greece’s 
approach to the region in the realm of economic relations, as it happened with 
its foreign affairs policies a few years back, appears to have entered a 
                                                 
6
 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been keen to emphasise the role of Greece in the signing 
of the ECT(see, for example, Skylakakis, 2006) although it should be acknowledged that the 
Treaty effectively integrates the SEE and EU-internal energy markets and is thus something 
that is in many respects beyond Greece’s role in the region. Still, Greece’s rhetoric supporting 
these initiatives emphasises the transformation of Greece to “an important energy node” 
(Stylianidis, n.a.), rather than the regional benefits from the establishment of an integrated 
energy market.  
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‘Europeanisation’ path, in the sense that it seems increasingly to be governed 
by a corporatist logic and to be more detached from narrow and short-termist 
ethnic-nationalist considerations.  
 
4. Positive policy shifts but no structural change 
Despite these apparent positive policy developments, which represent a clear 
policy shift with respect to Greece’s approach only ten or twelve years ago, the 
reasons for optimism and the grounds for a positive evaluation of Greek 
economic diplomacy in the Balkans are still not entirely well founded. A 
number of key structural characteristics of Greece’s policy paradigm seem to 
be responsible for this. With the danger of over-simplifying and overlooking 
the unquestionable complementarities that exist among them, these can be 
taken to include (i) the prevalence of the thesis of Greece’s economic 
penetration in the Balkans; (ii) Greece’s predominantly bilateralist approach to 
its Balkan economic relations; (iii) Greece’s reliance on the EU’s mechanisms 
and leverage for the further development of the region and, simultaneously, the 
lack of leadership in translating the key EU processes (especially the Lisbon 
strategy, but also other processes, including the Bologna process) into a 
developmental strategy for the region; (iv) the lack of a wider vision and 
strategy for the region, which will appreciate the benefits of, and actively 
pursue, the deeper and organic economic integration of the Balkan economic 
space; and (v) the persisting institutional weaknesses in the conception, design, 
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coordination and implementation of long-term economic strategies internally 
and with regards to its immediate neighbourhood.  
(i) Economic penetration. Although the unproductive rhetoric of the 
Balkans as a ‘Greek hinterland’ and of ‘Greek penetration in the 
Balkans’ has subsided and is now replaced by a more positive 
approach and language, the underlying notions of Greek 
expansionism and control are still deeply embedded in Greek public 
opinion and policy-making (Wallden, 2004). The more recent 
rhetoric of ‘Greece as a Gateway to the Balkans’ (e.g., Karamanlis, 
2006) may appear more ‘Europeanised’, but in reality the underlying 
thesis remains one of penetration and narrow exploitation of markets 
and opportunities, rather than one of deriving benefits from 
cooperation, strengthening the regional economy, or creating market 
potentials and a critical economic mass. Trapped in its negative 
approach to the EU, where for decades European integration has 
been seen predominantly, if not solely, as a means for mobilising 
national economic development and the synergies between Greek 
and European development were never really fully appreciated 
(Ioakimidis, 1998), Greece continues to reproduce this logic in its 
Balkan economic relations. The persisting weaknesses and 
ambiguities in the structure and objectives of Greece’s Balkan Plan 
are a testimony to this.7 The economic development of its 
neighbours is too often seen narrowly as a means for Greek 
economic growth or, when it is not combined with enhanced Greek 
involvement, as a threat to national growth. Sadly, without an 
explicit strategy for the organic integration of the region, economic 
                                                 
7
  According to the head of the team of evaluators of the project proposals in the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, “the projects must also have an economic and social benefit for Greece. We 
try to convince our [Balkan] partners that for all investments there must be Greek benefit. [τα 
έργα θα πρέπει να έχουν οικονοµικό και κοινωνικό όφελος και για την Ελλάδα. Κάνουµε 
προσπάθεια να πείσουµε τους εταίρους µας ότι για όλες τις επενδύσεις απαιτείται να υπάρχει 
ελληνικό όφελος] (Express, 2005).  
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development in the Balkans may well become such a threat 
(Petrakos, 2006; Monastiriotis, 2006). 
(ii) Bilateralism. Despite the rhetoric regarding Southeast Europe 
regionalism, the Balkan Plan is based on bilateral agreements8; 
special arrangements for trade and factor movements continue to 
govern relations with countries like Albania, FYROM and Serbia; 
and, above all, key strategic development plans continue to be 
bilateral and are not incorporated into relevant regional initiatives9. 
This bilateral structure of Greece’s Balkan economic relations 
reflects and reproduces the latent bilateralism (quasi-regionalism) 
that has characterised and limited the development of the region 
more generally at least since 1996 and has largely perpetuated its 
economic and political fragmentation. It is tempting to look for 
traces of EU’s bilateral approach to SEE in Greece’s Balkan 
bilateralism as Greece, especially after 1995, never managed to take 
a leading role in the region that would be sufficiently distinct (bolder 
and more regionalist) from the approach of its supranational partner. 
As is further elaborated below, this is perhaps one of the most 
significant constraints in the further development of the region, 
which arguably cannot be conceived outside the deepening of the 
organic integration of the Balkan economies.  
(iii) European perspective. Greece’s problematic relationship with the 
EU architecture accounts for a further weakness in the country’s 
Balkan economic relations. Although Greece’s support to the 
European perspective of the Balkans has been undoubtedly one of 
the most positive developments post-1995, emphasis on this support 
                                                 
8
 This is in fact one of the main reasons for the inability of Greece to reform the Plan and do 
part with its identified weaknesses (Dragasakis, cited in Harokopos, 2006).  
9
 For example, the Burgas-Alexandroupolis pipeline is based on a tri-lateral agreement 
between Russia, Bulgaria and Greece and it is not explicitly part of the SEE Oil and Gas 
Network (EC, 2001).  
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has not been combined with firmer attempts for Greece to take a 
leading role in the implementation of key EU processes in the 
Balkans. This would naturally involve a process of knowledge 
transfers (based on Greece’s own experience with European 
integration) at all levels of central and regional government as well 
as the private sector, especially in the two new Member States, for 
the formulation of policies aiming at the implementation of the 
Lisbon Strategy, the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines and the 
accession to the EMU – not to mention the more ‘low-profile’ issues 
of design and implementation of regional cohesion policies, 
adaptation to EU’s CAP and Competition policy, and more generally 
adoption of the existing European acqui. The lack of a wider 
regional vision and Greece’s own weaknesses in understanding and 
relating to the key EU processes post-EMU (Featherstone et al, 
2001; Featherstone, 2005a) seem to have played a key role in 
Greece’s failure to perform this role. One result of the limited Greek 
involvement in processes of dialogue, consultation and knowledge 
transfers in the Balkans is a further weakening of the prospects for 
economic integration and policy harmonisation in the region.  
(iv) Regionalist vision and strategy. As is evident from the previous 
points, despite the recent steps towards the institutionalisation of the 
SEE cooperation process and the Hellenic Plan for Economic 
Reconstruction in the Balkans, policy developments and actions 
(from Greece as well from other countries in the region) are hardly 
in the direction of furthering regional integration. The benefits of 
such a process are not fully appreciated and the whole region is 
leaning to the EU for political and economic support in ways not 
dissimilar from those followed by Greece in the past. 
Understandably for the former communist Balkans, short-term 
national economic considerations, although not always fully 
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qualified, dictate that priority should be given to deepening their 
economic relations with the EU. But for Greece the lack of a 
systematic effort to develop and build support for a wider 
developmental model for the region is really a deficiency that is hard 
to justify. Calls for attention in order for the region not to become 
the ‘new European south’ (Gligorov et al, 1999; Petrakos, 2002; 
Gligorov, 2004) have not found their way into policy; while the 
wider context, of increasing international competition from low-cost 
producers and intensifying pressures for the repositioning of the 
region in the international division of labour, has not really been 
appreciated. A truly regional developmental strategy could seek to 
develop new regional comparative (cost-based) and competitive 
(dynamic) advantages and new specialisations (perhaps in tourism, 
energy production and distribution, or in trademark processed 
agricultural products) based on strengthening the complementarities 
of the national production bases, exploiting common resources and 
historical or geo-political advantages and, above all, intensifying the 
economic links (in terms of trade in goods and services, direct 
investments and financial flows, as well as labour mobility and skill 
transfers) between and across the countries of the region. To say that 
this process is not actually happening is a bold understatement.   
(v) Institutional weaknesses. To an extent, the weak institutional 
framework for policy-making is simply another expression of 
Greece’s general reliance on personality (and thus also personal 
preferences) as well as on a generally manipulated and definitely ill-
educated public opinion for the formulation of policies (Ioakimidis, 
1999b; Theodoropoulos, 2005). Indeed, the absence of established 
structures for the development of long-run strategic policy 
frameworks in the case of Greece has long been identified in the 
literature (Sotiropoulos, 1993; Koliopoulos and Veremis, 2003; 
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Featherstone, 2005b). In the case of foreign policy, Ioakimidis 
(1999a) even goes to argue that, until recently, Greece ‘used to 
produce, not policies but “procedures” and “management” as 
substitutes for policy’ (p.180). It appears that, similarly, Greece can 
still only manage rather than direct its external economic relations, 
in the Balkans and elsewhere. Despite the opportunities offered, 
among others, by the Lisbon Strategy (Lyberaki, 2004), the country 
has not elaborated as yet – and in practice does not possess the 
necessary relevant institutions to do so – a detailed long-term plan 
regarding its future social and economic development, including its 
position in the international, European, and Balkan economic spaces.  
 
It is the combination of these main limitations that have constrained – and 
continue to do so – the development of a framework for Balkan economic 
relations that will be not only accommodating and non-confrontational but 
rather, and beyond that, constructive and with the ability to mobilise all 
relevant resources in the region for the economic upgrading of the Balkans 
within the European context and internationally.   
 
5. Conclusion: the road to a sustainable Greek Balkan regional economic 
policy 
It is of course easy to be critical to the weaknesses of policy and perhaps it is 
also easy in this process to overlook the important positive steps that Greece 
has made over the years with regards to its economic relations with its Balkan 
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neighbours. In the space of less than twenty years, following a long period of 
undeveloped and constrained economic and policy links, Greece experienced a 
significant transformation, abandoning its hostile and xenophobic approach to 
its northern neighbours and eventually developing an increasingly active, open 
and regionalist approach in this and in other domains of its external relations. 
These positive policy shifts, which include the consistent orientation towards 
supporting the European perspective of the Balkan countries (including 
Turkey), the establishment of a dense network of (predominantly bilateral but 
also some multilateral) economic cooperation agreements (which have 
normalised the relations with its neighbours and have tackled a host of 
problems, from trade barriers and migration to resource management and 
transport), the provision of financial assistance for the economic reconstruction 
of the region, and the continuing attempts to deepen and institutionalise the 
SEE framework for regional cooperation, constitute admittedly a significant 
achievement for Greece. They also pose, however, new challenges, especially 
as they raise expectations about the role that the country can play in the region.  
It should be clear that Greece must continue to play an active role in the 
processes of regional cooperation and accession to the EU for all the countries 
of the region. It should further seek to strengthen processes of economic 
collaboration for public and private projects and of policy dialogue and 
exchange. More importantly, however, Greece should take a leading role in 
setting up an agenda concerning the future of the Balkan region. Given the 
increasing pressures from globalisation, the continuing divergence (especially 
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of Western Balkans) from the EU15 and EU25 and the long-lasting needs for 
economic reconstruction and institutional development throughout the region, it 
is clear that simply following the slow path towards European integration – and 
being perhaps content with the further opening-up of the Balkan markets and 
the inflow of foreign investments – is not a viable approach to a sustainable 
path of economic and social development. The region must urgently look into 
itself, speed up and deepen its economic integration process, so as to be able to 
create a unified economic space and the necessary market size to withstand 
international competition and find a new economic identity and a new role in 
the international division of labour. Greece, as the more economically 
advanced and institutionally mature country in the region, must take a leading 
role in this process. But to do so, it must tackle its own limitations and 
weaknesses, the most important of which, it is hoped, have been identified 
here. 
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